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1 Introduction to Ad Hoc Wireless Networks
Wireless networks provide rapid, untethered access to information and com-
puting, eliminating the barriers of distance, time, and location for many
applications ranging from collaborative, distributed mobile computing to
disaster recovery (such as ﬁre, ﬂood, earthquake), law enforcement (crowd
control, search and rescue) and military communications (command, con-
trol, surveillance, and reconnaissance). An ad hoc network is a collection of
wireless mobile hosts forming a temporary network without the aid of any
established infrastructure or centralized administration [12].
In ad hoc wireless networks, every device has the role of router and ac-
tively participates in data forwarding. Communication between two nodes
can be performed directly if the destination is within the sender’s trans-
mission range, or through intermediate nodes acting as routers (multi-hop
transmission) if the destination is outside sender’s transmission range.
Some of the characteristics which diﬀerentiate ad hoc wireless networks
from other networks are:
1. Dynamic Network Topology. This is triggered by node mobility,
nodes leaving or joining the network, node inoperability due to the
2lack of power resources, etc. Nonetheless, the network connectivity
should be maintained in order to allow applications and services to
operate undisrupted.
2. Fluctuating Link Capacity. The eﬀects of high bit error rate are
more profound in wireless communication. More than one end-to-end
path can use a given link in ad hoc wireless networks, and if the link
were to break, could disrupt several sessions during period of high bit
transmission rate.
3. Distributed Operations The protocols and algorithms designed for
an ad hoc wireless network should be distributed in order to accom-
modate a dynamic topology and an infrastructureless architecture.
4. Limited Energy Resources Wireless devices are battery powered,
therefore there is a limited time they can operate without changing
or replenish their energy resources. Designing energy eﬃcient mecha-
nisms are thus an important feature in designing algorithms and pro-
tocols. Mechanisms used to reduce energy consumption include (a)
having nodes enter sleep state when they cannot send or receive data,
(b) choose routing paths that minimize energy consumption, (c) selec-
tively use nodes based on their energy status, (d) construct communi-
cation and data delivery structures that minimize energy consumption,
and (e) reduce networking overhead.
Designing communication protocols in the ad hoc wireless networks is
challenging because of the limited wireless transmission range, broadcast
nature of the wireless medium (hidden terminal and exposed terminal prob-
lems [15]), node mobility, limited power resources, and limited physical se-
curity. Advantages of using an ad hoc wireless networks include easy and
speedy deployment, robustness (no infrastructure required), adaptive and
self-organizing network.
In this chapter we are concerned with security of routing protocols in
ad hoc wireless networks. Routing is an important operation, providing the
communication protocol for data delivery between wireless devices. Assuring
a secure routing protocol is a challenging task since ad hoc wireless networks
are highly vulnerable to security attacks due to their unique characteristics.
Traditional routing protocols designs do not address security, and are based
on a mutual trust relationship between nodes.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We continue with an
overview of the routing protocols in ad hoc wireless networks in section
32. Security services and challenges in an ad hoc network environment are
presented in section 3. We continue with a classiﬁcation and description of
the main attacks on routing in section 4, followed by a description of the
state-of-the-art security mechanisms for routing protocols in section 5. Our
article ends in section 6 with conclusions.
2 Overview of Routing Protocols in Ad Hoc Wire-
less Networks
Routing is an important operation, being the foundation of data exchanging
between wireless devices. Each wireless node acts as a router and partici-
pate in the routing protocol. Routing relies therefore on an implicit trust
relationship among participating devices. Main routing responsibilities are
exchanging the routing information, ﬁnding a feasible path between source
and destination based on various metrics, and path maintenance.
The major requirements [15] of a routing protocol are (1) minimum route
acquisition delay, (2) quick route reconﬁguration in the case of path breaks,
(3) loop-free routing, (3) distributed routing protocol, (4) low control over-
head, (5) scalability with network size, (6) QoS support as demanded by
the application, (7) support of time-sensitive traﬃc, and (8) security and
privacy.
There are a number of challenges [15] triggered by the unique characteris-
tics of ad hoc wireless networks. Node mobility aﬀects network topology and
may incur packet lost, path disconnection, network partition and diﬃculty
in resource allocation. Wireless nodes are in general resource constrained,
in terms of battery power, memory and computing power. Wireless channel
has a high bit error rate (10−5 to 10−3) compared with wired counterparts
(10−12 to 10−9). Wireless channel is shared by the nodes in the same broad-
cast area, thus the link bandwidth available per node is limited, and varies
with the number of nodes present in that area. The design of routing pro-
tocols should take these factors into consideration.
Based on the routing information update mechanism, routing protocols
in ad hoc wireless networks can be classiﬁed as proactive (or table-driven)
protocols, reactive (or on-demand) protocols, and hybrid routing protocols.
In the next three subsections we present important features of each category
and short descriptions of several representative routing protocols.
42.1 Proactive Routing Protocols
In proactive routing protocols, nodes exchange routing information peri-
odically in order to maintain consistent and accurate routing information.
When a node has to transmit data to a destination, the path can be com-
puted rapidly based on the updated information available in the routing ta-
ble. The disadvantage of using a proactive protocol is high overhead needed
to maintain an up to date routing information. In ad hoc wireless networks,
node mobility triggers a dynamic topology that might require a large num-
ber of routing updates. This has a negative impact on resource constrained
wireless devices, bandwidth utilization, and throughput.
The protocols in this category are typically extensions of the wired net-
work routing protocols. Examples include Destination Sequence Distance
Vector (DSDV) [19], Wireless Routing Protocol (WRP) [14], Optimized
Links State Routing (OLSR) [3], etc.
Next we present the main features of DSDV [19]. A security enhance-
ment mechanism (SEAD [7]) for DSDV will be detailed later in section 5.1.
Similar with other distance vector protocols, DSDV ﬁnds shortest paths be-
tween nodes using a distributed version of the Bellman-Ford algorithm. Each
node maintains a routing table, with an entry for each possible destination
in the network. For each entry, the following ﬁelds are maintained: the des-
tination address, next hop on the shortest path to that destination, shortest
known distance to this destination, and a destination sequence number that
is created by the destination itself. To maintain an updated view of the
network topology, each node sends periodically to each of its neighbors its
routing table information. Based on the routing information received from
its neighbors, each node updates its routing table to reﬂect current status
of the network.
Sequence numbers play an important role in DSDV and are used for
preventing loop formation. Each entry in the routing table has a sequence
number. This is the most recent sequence number known for that destina-
tion, and is included in the periodic routing updates. If a node receives an
update with a smaller sequence number, then that update is ignored. A
newly advertised path is adopted if it has a greater sequence number, or if
it has the same sequence number but a lower metric.
Besides the periodic updates, there are triggered updates, issued when
important routing updates should be transmitted. When a broken link is
detected, the node creates a routing update with next odd sequence number
and metric value of inﬁnity. Routing update messages can be full dump,
5when information for all destination is sent, or incremental when only infor-
mation changed from the last full dump is sent.
Main advantage of using DSDV is that routes to all destinations are
always available, without requiring a route discovery process. Main disad-
vantage of DSDV is high overhead due to the periodic routing updates.
2.2 Reactive Routing Protocols
In the reactive routing protocols, a route discovery mechanism is initiated
only when a node does not know a path to a destination it wants to commu-
nicate with. In the case of mobile ad hoc network, reactive routing protocols
have been demonstrated to perform better with signiﬁcantly lower overheads
than proactive routing protocols since they are able to react quickly to the
many changes that may occur in node connectivity, and yet are able to re-
duce (or eliminate) routing overhead in periods or areas of the network in
which changes are less frequent.
A reactive routing protocol has two main operations, route discovery
(usually broadcasting using a form of controlled ﬂooding) and route main-
tenance. Various reactive protocols have been proposed in literature such as
Ad Hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) [20], Dynamic Source Rout-
ing (DSR) [12], Temporally Ordered Routing Algorithm (TORA) [18], etc.
We present next the main features of DSR and AODV. Security supporting
mechanisms for these protocols are presented later in section 5.
DSR [12] is a source routing protocol, and thus has the property that
each data packet carries the source-destination path in its header. Using
this information, intermediate nodes can determine who is the next hop this
packet should be forwarded to. Each node maintains a routing cache that
contains routing information that the node learned from routing information
forwarded or overheard. Every entry has an expiration time after which the
entry is deleted in order to avoid stale information.
DSR performs route discovery by having the sender broadcasts by ﬂood-
ing a RouteRequest packet. Each RouteRequest contains a sequence number
generated by the source node, in order to prevent loop formation and to avoid
multiple retransmissions by a node of the same RouteRequest packet. An
intermediate node checks the sequence number, and appends its own iden-
tiﬁer and forwards the RouteRequest only if this message is not a duplicate.
The receiver, upon receiving the RouteRequest, sends back a RouteReply
packet along the reverse route recorded in RouteRequest. Upon receiving
the RouteReply, the sender starts sending data to the receiver.
6As part of the route maintenance, if a node detects a failure (e.g. broken
link), it sends a RouteError message to the source. All intermediate nodes
hearing the RouteError update their routing cache and all routes that con-
tain this hop are truncated. If the source does not have an alternative path
to the destination, it has to re-initiate the path discovery mechanism.
DSR has several optimization techniques. First, it allows intermediate
nodes that know a path to the destination to reply to the RouteRequest
message instead of forwarding the request. This speeds up the route discov-
ery. Secondly, path discovery can use an expanding ring search mechanism
when sending the RouteRequest messages. This is especially useful for close
destinations, thus avoiding broadcasting in the whole network.
Advantages of DSR include (1) route maintenance apply only to ac-
tive routes, (2) route caching can speed up and reduce overhead of route
discovery, and (3) a single route discovery might yield more routes to the
destination when intermediate nodes reply from local caches. Disadvan-
tages of DSR are: (1) adding the source-destination path in each packet
incurs overhead, especially for long paths and small data, (2) the ﬂooding
used in route discovery is unreliable, redundant, may introduce collisions,
contentions, and (3) intermediate nodes might send RouteReply from stale
routing caches, thus polluting other caches as well.
AODV [20] implements the same main operations as DSR. It discovers
a path to a destination using a RouteRequest and RouteReply sequence, and
performs route maintenance for link failures by propagating a RouteError
message to the source. AODV tries to improve on DSR by maintaining
routing tables at the nodes, such that data packets do not contain the source-
destination path. Each node maintains a routing table for each destination
of interest, including the following ﬁelds: destination, next hop, number of
hops, destination sequence number, and expiration time.
When a source node broadcasts a RouteRequest to discover a path to a
destination, intermediate nodes that forward the message set up a reverse
path, pointing toward the node from which the request was received. In this
way RouteReply travels along the reverse paths set-up when RouteRequest
was forwarded, without carrying the full path in the header. When RouteRe-
ply travels along the reverse path, each node sets up forward links that will
be used later to forward data packets between the source and destination.
When a source node sends a RouteRequest, it assigns a higher sequence
number for that destination. Intermediate nodes are allowed to reply with
RouteReply only if they know a recent path to the destination (with the same
or higher sequence number). The reverse and forward paths are purged from
7the routing tables if they are not used within a speciﬁc time interval.
The advantages of AODV can be summarized as follows: (1) paths are
not included and carried in the packet headers, (2) nodes maintain routing
tables with entries only for the active routes (if not used for speciﬁc time
interval they are purged), and (3) AODV uses a destination sequence number
mechanism to limit the chances of an intermediate node replying with stale
information to a RouteRequest packet.
2.3 Hybrid Routing Protocols
Some ad hoc network routing protocols are hybrid of proactive and reac-
tive mechanisms. Examples of hybrid routing protocols are Zone Routing
Protocol (ZRP) [6], Core Extraction Distributed Ad Hoc Routing Protocol
(CEDAR) [23], etc.
ZRP [6] is a hybrid of proactive and reactive routing protocols. The
network is divided in zones, where every zone is a r-hop neighborhood of a
node. The intra-zone routing protocol is a proactive routing protocol, while
the inter-zone routing protocol is a reactive routing protocol. By varying
r, we can control the routing update control traﬃc. When a node wants
to transmit data to a destination within the same zone, then this is done
directly using the proactive routing protocol, and the information already
available in routing tables.
If the destination is in another zone, then the source node bordercasts the
RouteRequest (e.g. this message is forwarded by the border routers) until it
reaches the destination zone. The border node of the destination zone sends
then back a RouteReply message. Any node forwarding the RouteRequest
appends its address to it. This information is used when sending RouteReply
back to the source.
If a broken link is detected, the path reconstruction can be done locally,
and then a path update is sent to the source, or can be done globally, by
having the source re-initiate the path discovery.
ZRP eﬃciently explores the features of proactive and reactive proto-
cols. It reduces the control overhead by maintaining the proactive protocols
within zones, and reduces the ﬂooding drawbacks by deploying the reactive
protocol and bordercast mechanism only between the zones. Particular at-
tention should be considered when selecting the zone radius r, since this can
signiﬁcantly impact the routing performance.
82.4 Broadcasting in Ah Hoc Wireless Networks
Broadcasting refers to the operation of sending a message to all other hosts in
the network. Broadcasting is used for the route discovery in reactive routing
protocols. In a mobile environment, broadcasting is expected to be used
more frequently since nodes mobility might trigger path disconnecting and
thus route discovery is invoked as part of the path maintenance procedure.
Broadcasting operation has the following characteristics [26]: (1) the
broadcast is spontaneous, that means that each node can start broadcasting
at any time, and (2) broadcasting is unreliable. No acknowledgment packet
is sent for example in IEEE 802.11 by a node upon receiving a broadcast
message.
One straightforward method used to implement broadcasting is through
a form of controlled ﬂooding. In this method, each node retransmits a broad-
cast message when it receives it ﬁrst time. Transmitting a broadcast through
ﬂooding in a CSMA/CA network triggers a numbers of issues, commonly
referred to as the broadcast storm problem [26]:
1. Redundant rebroadcast. A node resends a broadcast message even
if all its neighbors have already received the message from some other
neighbors.
2. Contention. The neighbors of a transmitting node receive the mes-
sage at approximately the same time, and when re-sending the mes-
sage, they contend for the wireless communication medium.
3. Collision. Collisions are more likely to occur because of the lack
of back-oﬀ mechanism and the lack of RTS/CTS dialogue. Such an
example is when more neighbors retransmit at the same time a message
recently received.
The work of [26] proposes several schemes to alleviate the broadcast storm
problem, by limiting the cases when a node rebroadcasts a message: (1)
probabilistic scheme, when each node rebroadcasts a message with a speciﬁc
probability, (2) counter-based scheme, when a node retransmits a message if
it was received less than a threshold number of times over a ﬁxed interval, (3)
distance-based scheme, when a message is resent only if it is received from
neighbors farther away than a speciﬁc threshold distance, and (4) location-
based scheme, when a node retransmits a message only if the additional area
covered is larger than a speciﬁc threshold area.
9The work of [27] proposes several local and deterministic schemes where
a subset of nodes, called forward nodes, is selected locally while ensuring
broadcast coverage. In one scheme, each node decides its own forwarding
status, whereas in another scheme, the status of each node is determined by
neighbors jointly.
In section 5.11, we discuss few mechanisms proposed recently in literature
to secure the broadcast operation.
3 Security Services and Challenges in Ad Hoc Wire-
less Networks
In order to assure a reliable data transfer over the communication networks
and to protect the system resources, a number of security services are re-
quired. Based on their objectives, the security services are classiﬁed in
ﬁve categories [24]: availability, conﬁdentiality, authentication, integrity and
nonrepudiation.
• Availability: Availability implies that the requested services (e.g.
bandwidth and connectivity) are available in a timely manner even
though there is a potential problem in the system. Availability of a
network can be tempered for example by dropping oﬀ packets and by
resource depletion attacks.
• Conﬁdentiality: Conﬁdentiality ensures that classiﬁed information
in the network is never disclosed to unauthorized entities. Conﬁden-
tiality can be achieved by using diﬀerent encryption techniques so that
only the legitimate communicating nodes can analyze and understand
the transmission. The content disclosure attack and location disclo-
sure attack reveals the contents of the message being transmitted and
physical information about a particular node respectively.
• Authenticity: Authenticity is a network service to determine a user’s
identity. Without authentication, an attacker can impersonate any
node, and in this way, one by one node, it can gain control over the
entire network.
• Integrity: Integrity guarantees that information passed on between
nodes has not been tempered in the transmission. Data can be altered
both intentionally and accidentally (for example through hardware
glitches, or in case of ad hoc wireless connections through interference).
10• Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation ensures that the information orig-
inator can not deny having sent the information. This service is useful
for detection and isolation of compromised nodes in the network. Many
authentication and secure routing algorithms implemented in ad hoc
networks rely on trust-based concepts. The fact that a message can
be attributed to a speciﬁc node helps making these algorithms more
secure.
Designing a secure ad hoc wireless networks communication is a challeng-
ing task due to (1) insecure wireless communication links, (2) absence of a
ﬁxed infrastructure, (3) resource constraints (e.g. battery power, bandwidth,
memory, CPU processing capacity), and (4) node mobility that triggers a
dynamic network topology.
The majority of traditional routing protocols design fail to provide se-
curity. The main requirements [15] of a secure routing protocol are: (1)
detection of malicious nodes; such nodes should be avoided in the routing
process, (2) guarantee of correct route discovery, (3) conﬁdentiality of net-
work topology; if an attacker learns the network topology, he can attack the
bottleneck nodes, detected by studying the traﬃc patters. This will result
in disturbing the routing process and DoS, and (4) stability against attacks;
the routing protocol must be able to resume the normal operation within a
ﬁnite amount of time after an attack.
4 Security Attacks on Routing Protocols in Ad
Hoc Wireless Networks
Providing a secure system can be achieved by preventing attacks or by de-
tecting them and providing a mechanism to recover for those attacks. At-
tacks on ad hoc wireless networks can be classiﬁed as active and passive
attacks, depending on whether the normal operation of the network is dis-
rupted or not.
1. Passive Attack: In passive attacks, an intruder snoops the data ex-
changed without altering it. The attacker does not actively initiate
malicious actions to cheat other hosts. The goal of the attacker is to
obtain information that is being transmitted, thus violating the mes-
sage conﬁdentiality. Since the activity of the network is not disrupted,
these attackers are diﬃcult to detect. Powerful encryption mechanism
11can alleviate these attackers by making diﬃcult to read overheard
packets.
2. Active Attack: In active attacks, an attacker actively participates in
disrupting the normal operation of the network services. A malicious
host can create an active attack by modifying packets or by introducing
false information in the ad hoc network. It confuses routing procedures
and degrades network performance. Active attacks can be divided into
internal and external attacks:
External Attacks are carried by nodes that are not legitimate part
of the network. Such attacks can be defended by using encryption,
ﬁrewalls and source authentication. In external attacks, it is possible
to disrupt the communication of an organization from the parking lot
in front of the company oﬃce.
Internal Attacks are from compromised nodes that were once legit-
imate part of the network. Since the adversaries are already part of
the ad hoc wireless network as authorized nodes, they are much more
severe and diﬃcult to detect when compared to external attacks.
A large number of attacks have been identiﬁed in literature that aﬀect
the routing in ad hoc wireless networks. Solutions and mechanism that
defense against various attacks are presented later in section 5. Next, we
classify routing attacks into ﬁve categories: attacks using impersonation,
modiﬁcation, fabrication, replay, and denial of service (DoS).
4.1 Attacks using Impersonation
In impersonation attacks, an intruder assumes the identity and privileges of
another node in order to consume its resources or to disturb normal network
operation. An attacker node achieves impersonation by misrepresenting its
identity. This can be done by changing its own IP or MAC address to that
of some other legitimate node. Some strong authentication procedures can
be used to stop attacks by impersonation.
Man-in-the-Middle Attack
In this attack, a malicious node reads and possibly modiﬁes the messages
between two parties. The attacker can impersonate the receiver with respect
to the sender, and the sender with respect to the receiver, without having
either of them realize that they have been attacked.
12Sybil Attack
In the Sybil attack [16], an attacker pretends to have multiple identities. A
malicious node can behaves as if it were a larger number of nodes either
by impersonating other nodes or simply by claiming false identities. Sybil
attacks are classiﬁed into three categories: direct/indirect communication,
fabricated/stolen identity, and simultaneity. In the direct communication,
Sybil nodes communicate directly with legitimate nodes, whereas in the
indirect communication messages sent to Sybil nodes are routed through
malicious nodes. An attacker can fabricate a new identity or it can simply
steal it after destroying or temporarily disabling the impersonated node. All
Sybil identities can participate simultaneously in the network or they may
be cycled through.
4.2 Attacks using Modiﬁcation
This attack disrupts the routing function by having the attacker illegally
modifying the content of the messages. Examples of such attacks include
redirection by changing the route sequence number and redirection with
modiﬁed hop count that can trigger the black hole attack. Some other
modiﬁcation based attacks are presented next.
Misrouting Attack
In the misrouting attack, a non-legitimate node sends data packet to the
wrong destination. This type of attack is carried out by modifying the ﬁnal
destination address of the data packet or by forwarding a data packet to the
wrong next hop in the route to the destination.
Detour Attack
In this type of attack, the attacker adds a number of virtual nodes in to
a route during the route discovery phase. As a consequence, the traﬃc
is diverted to other routes that appear to be shorter and might contain
malicious nodes which could create other attacks. The attacking node can
save energy in a detour attack because it does not have to forward packets
to that destination itself. This attack is speciﬁc to source routing protocols.
Blackmail Attack
Blackmail attack causes false identiﬁcation of a good node as malicious node.
In ad hoc wireless networks, nodes usually keep information of perceived
malicious nodes in a blacklist. An attacker may blackmail a good node and
tell other nodes in the network to add that node to their blacklists as well,
thus avoiding the victim node in future routes.
134.3 Attacks using Fabrication
In fabrication attacks, an intruder generates false routing messages, such
as routing updates and route error messages, in order to disturb network
operation or to consume other node resources. A number of fabrication
messages are presented next.
Resource Consumption Attack
In this attack, a malicious node deliberately tries to consume the resources
(e.g. battery power, bandwidth, etc.) of other nodes in the network. The
attack can be in the form of unnecessary route requests, route discovery, con-
trol messages, or by sending stale information. For example, in routing table
overﬂow attack, a malicious node advertises routes to non-existent nodes,
thus causing routing table overﬂow. By using packet replication attack, an
adversary consumes bandwidth and battery power of other nodes.
Routing Table Poisoning
In this attack, a malicious node sends false routing updates, resulting in
sub-optimal routing, network congestion, or network partition.
Rushing Attack
A malicious node in rushing attack attempts to tamper RouteRequest pack-
ets, modifying the node list, and hurrying its packet to the next node. Since
in on demand routing protocol only one RouteRequest packet is forwarded, if
the route requests forwarded by the attacker are ﬁrst to reach target (desti-
nation), then any route found by the route discovery mechanism will include
a path through the attacker.
Black Hole
In this type of attack, a malicious node advertise itself as having the shortest
path to all nodes in the network (e.g. the attacker claims that it is a level-
one node). The attacker can cause DoS by dropping all the received packets.
Alternately, the attacker can monitor and analyze the traﬃc to ﬁnd activity
patterns of each node. Sometimes the black hole becomes the ﬁrst step of a
man-in-the-middle attack.
Gray Hole
Under this attack, an attacker drops all data packets but it lets control mes-
sages to route through it. This selective dropping makes gray hole attacks
much more diﬃcult to detect then blackhole attack.
144.4 Replay Attacks
In the replay attack, an attacker retransmits data to produce an unautho-
rized eﬀect. Examples of replay attacks are wormhole attack and tunneling
attack.
Wormhole Attack
In the wormhole attack [11], two compromised nodes can communicate with
each other by a private network connection. The attacker can create a
vertex cut of nodes in the network by recording a packet at one location in
network, tunneling the packet to another location, and replaying it there.
The attacker does not require key material as it only needs two transceivers
and one high quality out-of-band channel. The wormhole can drop packets
or it can selectively forward packets to avoid detection. It is particularly
dangerous against diﬀerent network routing protocols in which the nodes
consider themselves neighbor after hearing a packet transmission directly
from some node.
Tunneling Attack
In a tunneling attack [22], two or more nodes collaborate and exchange en-
capsulated messages along existing data routes. For example, if a RouteRequest
packet is encapsulated and sent between two attackers, the packet will not
contain the path traveled between the two attackers. This would falsely
make the receiver conclude that the path containing the attackers is the
shortest path available.
4.5 Denial of Service (DoS)
In the DoS attack [15], an attacker explicitly attempts to prevent legitimate
users from using system services. This type of attack impacts the availability
of the system. An ad hoc wireless network is vulnerable to DoS attacks be-
cause of its dynamic changing topology and distributed protocols. Examples
of DoS attacks include:
Consumption of Scarce Resources
Attacker can consume valuable network resources (e.g. bandwidth, memory
and access points) so that the entire network becomes unavailable to users.
Destruction or Alteration of Conﬁguration Information
In this DoS attack, an attacker attempts to alter or destroy conﬁguration
information, thus preventing legitimate users from using the network. An
15improperly conﬁgured network may not perform well or may not operate at
all.
5 Security Mechanisms and Solutions for Routing
Protocols in Ad Hoc Wireless Networks
Message encryption and digital signatures are two important mechanisms
for data integrity and user authentication.
There are two types of data encryption mechanisms, symmetric and
asymmetric (or public key) mechanisms. Symmetric cryptosystems use the
same key (the secret key) for encryption and decryption of a message, and
asymmetric cryptosystems use one key (the public key) to encrypt a message
and another key (the private key) to decrypt it. Public and private keys
are related in such a way that only the public key can be used to encrypt
messages and only the corresponding private key can be used for decryption
purpose. Even if attacker comprises a public key, it is virtually impossible
to deduce the private key.
Any code attached to an electronically transmitted message that uniquely
identiﬁes the sender is known as digital code. Digital signatures are key com-
ponent of most authentication schemes. To be eﬀective, digital signatures
must be non-forgeable. Hash functions are used in creation and veriﬁcation
of a digital signature. It is an algorithm which creates a digital representa-
tion or ﬁngerprint in the form of a hash value (or hash result) of a standard
length which is usually much smaller than the message and unique to it.
Any change to the message will produce a diﬀerent hash result even when
the same hash function is used. In the case of a secure hash function, also
known as a one-way hash function, it is computationally infeasible to derive
the original message from knowledge of its hash value.
In ad hoc wireless networks, the secrecy of the key does not ensure the
integrity of the message. For this purpose, Message Authentication Code
(MAC) [1] is used. It is a hashed representation of a message and even if
MAC is known, it is impractical to compute the message that generated it.
A MAC, which is a cryptographic checksum, is computed by the message
initiator as a function of the secret key and the message being transmitted
and it is appended to the message. The recipient re-computes the MAC in
the similar fashion upon receiving the message. If the MAC computed by
the receiver matches the MAC received with the message then the recipient
is assured that the message was not modiﬁed.
16Next, we present security mechanisms speciﬁcally tailored for speciﬁc
routing mechanisms.
5.1 Secure Eﬃcient Ad hoc Distance Vector (SEAD)
Secure Eﬃcient Ad hoc Distance Vector (SEAD) [7] is a proactive routing
protocol, based on the design of DSDV [19]. Besides the ﬁelds common with
DSDV, such as destination, metric, next hop and sequence number, SEAD
routing tables maintain a hash value for each entry, as described below.
This paper is concerned with protecting routing updates, both periodic and
triggered, by preventing an attacker to forge better metrics or sequence
numbers in such update packets.
The key feature of the proposed security protocol is the use one-way hash
chains, using an one way hash function H. Each node computes a list of
hash values h0,h1,   ,hn, where hi = H(hi−1) and 0 < i ≤ n, based on an
initial random value h0. The paper assumes the existence of a mechanism
for distributing hn to all intended receivers. If a node knows H and a
trusted value hn, then it can authenticate any other value hi, 0 < i ≤ n by
successively applying the hash function H and then comparing the result
with hn.
To authenticate a route update, a node adds a hash value to each routing
table entry. For a metric j and a sequence number i, the hash value hn−mi+j
is used to authenticate the routing update entry for that sequence number,
where m − 1 is the maximum network diameter. Since an attacker cannot
compute a hash value with a smaller index than the advertised value, he is
not able to advertise a route to the same destination with a greater sequence
number, or with a better metric.
SEAD provides a robust protocol against attackers trying to create in-
correct routing state in other node by modifying the sequence number or
the routing metric. SEAD does not provide a way to prevent an attacker
from tampering next hop or destination ﬁeld in a routing update. Also, it
cannot prevent an attacker to use the same metric and sequence number
learned from some recent update message, for sending a new routing update
to a diﬀerent destination.
5.2 ARIADNE
ARIADNE [8], an eﬃcient on-demand secure routing protocol, provides se-
curity against arbitrary active attackers and relies only on eﬃcient sym-
17metric cryptography. It prevents attackers from tampering uncompromised
routes consisting of uncompromised nodes.
ARIADNE ensures point-to-point authentication of a routing message
by combining a shared key between the two parties and MAC. However, for
secure authentication of a routing message, it relies on the TESLA [21] (see
section 5.11) broadcast authentication protocol.
Design of ARIADNE is based on DSR (see section 2.1). Similar with
DSR, it consists of two basic operations, route discovery and route main-
tenance. ARIADNE makes use of eﬃcient combination of one way hash
function and shared keys. It assumes that sender and receiver share secret
(non-TESLA) keys for message authentication. The initiator (or sender)
includes a MAC computed with an end-to-end key and the target (or desti-
nation) veriﬁes the authenticity and freshness of the request using the shared
key. Pre-hop hashing mechanism, a one-way hash function that veriﬁes that
no hop is omitted, is also used in Ariadne. In the case of any dead link, a
RouteError message is sent back to the initiator. Errors are generated just
as regular data packets and intermediate nodes remove routes that use dead
links in the selected path.
ARIADNE provides a strong defense against attacks that modify and
fabricate routing information. When it is used with an advanced version
of TESLA called TIK (see section 5.9), it is immune to wormhole attacks.
However, it is still vulnerable to selﬁsh node attack. General security mech-
anisms are very reliable but key exchanges are complicated, making ARI-
ADNE infeasible in the current ad hoc environments.
5.3 Security Aware Routing (SAR)
Security Aware Routing (SAR) [13] is an on demand routing protocol based
on AODV (see section 2.2). It integrates the trust level of a node and the
security attributes of a route to provide an integrated security metric for
the requested route. By incorporating a Quality of Protection (QoP) as a
routing metric, the route discovery can return quantiﬁable secure routes.
The QoP vector used is a combination of security level and available cryp-
tographic techniques
SAR introduces the notion of a trust hierarchy, where nodes of the ad
hoc wireless network are divided into diﬀerent trust levels such that an
initiator can impose a minimum trust level for all the nodes participating in
the source-destination communication. Note that a path with the required
trust level might not exist even if the network is connected. Even if SAR
18discovers fewer routes than AODV, they are always secured.
The initiator of the route in SAR includes a security metric in the route
request. This security metric is the minimum trust level of the nodes that
can participate in the route discovery. Consequently, only those nodes that
have this minimum security level can participate in the route discovery. All
other nodes that are below that trust level will drop the request packets.
If an end-to-end path with the required security is found, the intermediate
node or destination sends a suitably modiﬁed RouteReply. In the case of
multiple paths satisfying the required security attributes, SAR selects the
shortest such route. If route discovery fails, then a message can be sent to
the initiator so that it can lower the trust level.
In the case of a successful path search, SAR always ﬁnds a route with
quantiﬁable guarantee of security. This can be done by having nodes of a
trust level share a key. Thus, a node that does not have a particular trust
level will not possess the key for that level, and as a result it will not be
able to decrypt the packets using the key of that level. Therefore, it will not
have any other option but to drop the packet.
SAR uses sequence numbers and timestamps to stop replay attacks.
Threats like interception and subversion can be prevented by trust level
key authentication. Modiﬁcation and fabrication attacks can be stopped by
verifying the digital signatures of the transmitted packets.
One of the main drawbacks of using SAR is the excessive encrypting
and decrypting required at each hop during the path discovery. In a mobile
environment, the extra processing leads to an increased power consumption.
A route discovered by SAR may not be the shortest route in terms of
hop-count, but it is secure. Such a path ensures that only the nodes having
the required trust level will read and re-route the packets, but at the same
time malicious node can steal the required key, a case in which the protocol
is still open for all kinds of attacks.
5.4 Secure Routing Protocol (SRP)
Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) [17], is another protocol extension that can
be applied to many of the on demand routing protocols used today. SRP
defends against attacks that disrupt the route discovery process and guar-
antees to identify the correct topological information.
The basic idea of SRP is to set up a security association (SA) between a
source and a destination node without the need of cryptographic validation
of the communication data by the intermediate nodes. SRP assumes that
19this SA can be achieved through a shared key KST between the source S
and target T. Such a security association should exist priori to the route
initiation phase.
The source S initiates the route discovery by sending a route request
packet to the destination T. The SRP uses an additional header called SRP
header to the underlying routing protocol (e.g. AODV) packet. SRP header
contains the following ﬁelds: the query sequence number QSEC, query iden-
tiﬁer number QID, and a 96 bit MAC ﬁeld.
Intermediate nodes discard a route request message if SRP header is
missing. Otherwise, they forward the request towards destination after ex-
tracting QID, source, and destination address. Highest priority is given to
nodes that generate requests at the lowest rates and vice versa.
When the target T receives this request packet, it veriﬁes if the packet
has originated from the node with which it has SA. If QSEC is greater or
equal to QMAX, the request is dropped as it is considered to be replayed.
Otherwise it calculates the keyed hash of the request ﬁelds and if the output
matches SRP MAC then authenticity of the sender and integrity of the
request are veriﬁed.
On the reception of a route reply, S checks the source address, destination
addresses, QID, and QSEC. It discards the route reply if it does not match
the currently pending query. In case of a match, it compares reply IP source-
route with the exact reverse of the route carried in reply packet. If the two
routes match then S calculates the MAC by using the replied route, the
SRP header ﬁelds, and the secure key between source and destination. If
the two MAC match then the validation is successful and it conﬁrms that
the reply did came from the destination T.
SRP suﬀers from the lack of validation mechanism for route maintenance
messages as it does not stop a malicious node from harming routes to which
that node already belongs to. SRP is immune to IP spooﬁng because it
secures the binding of the MAC and IP address of the nodes but it is prone
to wormhole attacks and invisible node attacks.
5.5 Secure Routing Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks (ARAN)
A Secure Routing Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks (ARAN) [22] is an on-
demand protocol designed to provide secure communications in managed-
open environments. Nodes in a managed-open environment exchange ini-
tialization parameters before the start of communication. Session keys are
exchanged or distributed through a trusted third party like a certiﬁcation
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Each node in ARAN receives a certiﬁcate after securely authenticating
its identity to a trusted certiﬁcate server T. Nodes use these certiﬁcates
to authenticate themselves to other nodes during the exchange of routing
messages. The certiﬁcate contains the node’s IP address, its public key, as
well as the time of issuing and expiration. These ﬁelds are concatenated and
signed by the server T. A node A receives a certiﬁcate as: T → A : certA
=[IPA, KA+, t, e] KT−.
In the authentication phase, ARAN ensures the existence of a secure
path to the destination. Each intermediate node in the network stores the
route pair (previous node, the destination node). All the ﬁelds are concate-
nated and signed with source node I’s private key. A combination of the
nonce number (NI) and timestamp (t) is used to obtain data freshness and
timeliness property. Each time I performs a route discovery, it monotoni-
cally increases the nonce. The signature prevents spooﬁng attacks that may
alter the route or form loops. Source node I broadcasts a Route Discovery
Packet (RDP) for a destination D as I → brdcst :[RDP, IPD, certI, NI,
t]KI−.
Each node that receives the RDP for the ﬁrst time removes any other
intermediate node’s signature, signs the RDP using its own key, and broad-
casts it to all its neighboring nodes. This continues until destination node
D eventually receives the packet.
After receiving the RDP, the destination node D sends a Reply (REP)
packet back along the reverse path to the source node I. If J is the ﬁrst
node on the reverse path, REP packet is sent as D → J :[ REP, IPI, certD,
NI, t] KD−.
When the source node I receives the REP packet, it veriﬁes the destina-
tion’s signature KD− and nonce NI. When there is no traﬃc on an existing
route for some speciﬁc time, then that route is deactivated in the routing
table. Nodes use an ERR message to report links in active routes broken
due to node movement.
Using pre-determined cryptographic certiﬁcates, ARAN provides net-
work services like authentication and non-repudiation. Simulations show
that ARAN is eﬃcient in discovering and maintaining routes but routing
packets are larger in size and overall routing load is high. Due to heavy
asymmetric cryptographic computation, ARAN has higher cost for route
discovery. It is not immune to wormhole attack and if nodes do not have
time synchronization, then it is prone to replay attacks as well.
215.6 Security Protocols for Sensor Network (SPINS)
Security Protocols for Sensor Network (SPINS) [25] is a suite of two se-
curity building blocks which are optimized for ad hoc wireless networks. It
provides important network services like data conﬁdentiality, two party data
authentication, and data freshness through Secure Network Encryption Pro-
tocol (SNEP) and secure broadcast through Micro Timed Eﬃcient Stream
Loss-tolerant Authentication (µTESLA).
Most of the current protocols are not practical for secure broadcast as
they use asymmetric digital signatures. These signatures have high cost of
creation and veriﬁcation. SPINS introduces µTESLA (see section 5.11), an
enhanced version of TESLA which uses symmetric cryptographic techniques
for authentications and asymmetry cryptography only for the delayed disclo-
sure of keys. Tight lower bound on the key disclosure delay and robustness
against DoS attacks makes µTESLA a very eﬃcient and secure protocol for
data broadcast.
SNEP provides point to point communication in the wireless network. It
relies on a shared counter between a sender and a receiver in order to ensure
semantic security. Thus it protects message contents of encrypted messages
from eavesdroppers. Since both nodes share the counter and increment it
after each block, the counter does not need to be sent with the message. In
this way, the same message is encrypted diﬀerently each time. A receiver
node is assured that the message originated from the legitimate node if
the MAC veriﬁes successfully. The counter value in the MAC eliminates
replaying of old messages in the network.
SPINS is the ﬁrst secure and lightweight broadcast authentication pro-
tocol. The computation costs of symmetric cryptography are low and the
communication overhead of 8 bytes per message is almost negligible when
compared to the size of a message. SNEP ensures semantic security, data
authentication, replay protection, and message freshness whereas µTESLA
provides authentication for secure data broadcast.
5.7 Cooperation Of Nodes Fairness In Dynamic Ad-hoc NeT-
works (CONFIDANT)
Cooperation Of Nodes Fairness In Dynamic Ad-hoc NeTworks (CONFI-
DANT) [2] protocol is designed as an extension to reactive source-routing
protocol such as DSR. It is a collection of components which interact with
each other for monitoring, reporting, and establishing routes by avoiding
22misbehaving nodes. CONFIDANT components in each node include a net-
work monitor, reputation system, trust manager, and a path manager.
Each node in this protocol monitors their neighbors and updates the
reputation accordingly. If they detect any misbehaving or malicious node,
they can inform other friend nodes by sending an ALARM message. When
a node receives such an ALARM either directly from another node or by
listening to the ad hoc network, it calculates how trustworthy the ALARM
is based on the source of the ALARM and the total number of ALARM
messages about the misbehaving node.
Trust manager sends alarm messages to other nodes to warn them of
malicious nodes. Incoming alarms are checked for trustworthiness. Trust
manager contains an alarm table, trust level table and a friend list of all
trust worthy nodes to which a node will send alarms.
Local rating lists and black lists are maintained in the reputation system.
These lists are exchanged with friend nodes and timeouts are used to avoid
old lists. A node gives more importance to its own experience than to
those events which are observed and reported by others. Whenever the
threshold for certain behavior is crossed, path manager does the re-ranking
by deleting the paths containing malicious nodes and ignoring any request
from misbehaving nodes. At the same time, it sends an alert to the source
of the path so that it can discover some other route.
When DSR is fortiﬁed with the CONFIDANT protocol extensions, it is
very scalable in terms of the total number of nodes in the network and it
performs well even if more than 60% of the nodes are misbehaving. The
overhead for incorporating diﬀerent security components is manageable for
ad hoc environment. However, detection based reputation system has few
limitations and routes are still vulnerable to spooﬁng and Sybil attacks.
5.8 Defense Mechanisms Against Rushing Attacks
Rushing attacks [9] (see section 4.3) are mostly directed against on demand
routing protocols such as DSR. To counter such attacks, a generic secure
route discovery component called Rushing Attack Prevention (RAP) is used.
RAP combines the following mechanisms: Secure Neighbor Detection, Se-
cure Route Delegation, and Randomized Route Request Forwarding. Any
on demand routing protocol such as ARIADNE can be used as underlying
protocol to RAP.
In Secure Neighbor Detection, a three round mutual authentication pro-
cedure is used between a sender and a receiver to check if they are within
23normal communication range of each other. First, a node forwards a Neigh-
bor Solicitation packet to the neighboring node which replies with a Neighbor
Reply packet and ﬁnally, the initial node sends Neighbor Veriﬁcation packet
to conﬁrm that both nodes are neighbors.
Secure Route Delegation veriﬁes that all the steps in Secure Neighbor
Detection phase were carried out. Before sending a route update to its
neighbor, it signs a route attestation, delegating the rights to the neighbor
to further propagate the update.
In Randomize Message Forwarding, a node buﬀers k route requests and
then it randomly forwards only one of these k requests. By limiting the
total number of requests sent by a node, it prevents ﬂood attacks in the
network. Each request carries the list of all the nodes traversed by that
request. Furthermore, bi-directional veriﬁcation is also used to authenticate
the neighbors.
By using eﬃciently combining these three mechanisms, RAP can ﬁnd
usable routes when other protocols cannot. When it is enabled, it has higher
overhead than other protocols, but currently it is the only protocol that can
defend against rushing attacks. However, network is still prone to rushing
attacks if an attacker can compromise k nodes.
5.9 Defense Mechanisms Against Wormhole Attacks
In order to prevent the wormwhole attacks (see section 4.4), the packet
leashes mechanism [11] proposes to add additional information (referred as
leashes) to the packets in order to restrict packet’s maximum allowed trans-
mission distance.
Geographical leash and temporal leash can be used to detect and stop
wormhole attacks. Geographical leash insures that the recipient of the
packet is within a certain distance from the sender while temporal leash
is used to enforce an upper bound on the packet’s life time, thus restricting
packet’s maximum travel distance. Temporal leash uses packet’s expiration
time to detect a wormhole. The expiration time is computed based on the
allowed maximum transmission distance and the speed of light. A node will
not accept any packet if this expiration time has passed.
TIK (TESLA with Instant Key Disclosure) protocol is an extension of
TESLA (see section 5.11) and it is implemented with temporal leashes to
detect wormholes. It requires each communicating node to know one public
key for each other node in the network. The TIK protocol uses an eﬃcient
mechanism Merkle Hash tree [10] for key authentication. The root value m
24of the resulting hash tree commits to all the keys and is used to authenticate
any leaf key eﬃciently. Hash trees are generally large so only the upper layers
are stored while lower layers can be computed on demand.
The TIK packet is transmitted by sender S as S → R : HMACKi(M),
M, T, Ki, where M is the message payload, T are the tree authentication
values, and Ki is the key used to generate the HMAC. After the receiver R
receives the HMAC value, it uses the hash tree root m and the hash tree
values T to verify that the key Ki at the end of the packet is authentic,
and then uses the key Ki to verify the HMAC value in the packet. The
receiver R only accepts the packet as authentic if all these veriﬁcations are
successful.
A receiver can verify the TESLA security condition as it receives the
packet, thereby eliminating the authentication delay of TESLA. Packet
leashes are eﬀective mechanisms, but TIK is not feasible in resource con-
straint networks due to the expensive cryptographic mechanisms imple-
mented. The lack of accurate time synchronization in today’s systems pre-
vent TIK from providing a usable wormhole detection mechanism. Another
potential problem with leashes using a timestamp in a packet is that the
sender may not know the precise time at which it will transmit the packet
and generating a digital signature in that time may not be possible.
5.10 Defense Mechanisms Against Sybil Attacks
In a Sybil attack [16] (see section 4.1), a malicious node acts on behalf of
a larger number of nodes either by impersonating other nodes or simply by
claiming false identities. Most of the secure protocols are prone to this type
of attack. However, there are various key distribution mechanisms which
can be used eﬃciently to defend against Sybil attacks.
Sybil nodes can carry out a variety of attacks. For example, network
nodes use voting for many purposes. With enough Sybil nodes, an attacker
may be able to determine the outcome of every vote. Sybil nodes, due
to their larger number, are allocated more resources and they can create
DoS for legitimate nodes. Ad hoc wireless networks can use misbehavior
detection property to detect any malfunctioning node. An attacker with
many Sybil nodes can spread the blame and pass unnoticed, having only
small misbehavior actions associated with each identity.
There are a number of ways to detect Sybil attacks. In radio resource
testing, it is assumed that nodes have only one radio and are not capable
of sending or receiving on more than one channel. If a node wants to verify
25whether its neighbors are Sybil nodes, then it assigns to each of its neighbors
a diﬀerent channel to broadcast messages. Then the node listens to one of
the channels. If a message is received, this is an indication of a legitimate
neighbor, whereas an idle transmission is an indication of a Sybil node.
A more authentic way of defending against Sybil attacks is random key
predistribution. A random set of keys are assigned to each node and then
every node can compute the common keys it shares with its neighbors. If
two nodes share q common keys, they can establish a secure link. An one-
way Pseudo Random hash Function (PRF) is used for validation. Thus, an
attacker can not just gather a bunch of keys and claim an identity since
PRF is an one way hash function.
There are two types of key distribution mechanisms [5] to counter Sybil
attacks. In single-space pairwise key distribution, each pair of nodes is as-
signed a unique key. A node i stores unique public information Ui and pri-
vate information Vi. The node i computes its key from f(Vi,Uj) where Uj is
the public key of neighboring node j. Validation is successful if a node has
the pairwise key between itself and the veriﬁer. In multi-space pairwise key
distribution, each node is assigned, by the network, k out of m random key
spaces. If two neighboring nodes have at least one key space in common,
then they can compute their pairwise secret key using the corresponding
single space scheme.
This is the ﬁrst work that proposes various defense mechanisms against
the Sybil attacks, such as radio resource testing and random key predistribu-
tion. Random key predistribution is already required in many applications
to secure radio communication. The most eﬀective against Sybil attacks is
the multi-space pairwise key distribution mechanism.
5.11 Security Mechanisms for Broadcast Operation
Timed Eﬃcient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA) [21] is an ef-
ﬁcient broadcast authentication protocol with low communication and com-
putation overhead. It can scale to large numbers of receivers, can tolerate
packet loss, and uses loose time synchronization between sender and re-
ceivers.
TESLA mainly uses purely symmetric cryptographic functions, however,
it achieves asymmetric properties from clock synchronization and delayed
key disclosure. In this way, it does not require to compute expensive one-
way functions. For this purpose, it needs sender and receivers to be loosely
time-synchronized and for a secure authentication, either the receiver or the
26sender must buﬀer some messages.
For secure broadcasting, a sender chooses a random initial key KN and
generates a one-way key chain by repeatedly computing the one-way hash
function H on the starting value KN−1 = H[KN] , KN−2 = H[KN−1], ...,
K0 = H[K1] . In general, Ki = H[Ki+1] = HN−i[KN] where Hi[x] is the
result of applying the function H to x, for i times.
The sender node predetermines a schedule at which it discloses each
key of its one-way key chain. Keys are disclosed in the reverse order from
generation, i.e. K0,K1,K2,...,KN then the MAC computed using the key
Ki is added to the packet. When the packet reaches the receiver, it checks the
security condition of the key disclosure. If the key Ki used to authenticate
the packet was not disclosed, then it buﬀers the packet and waits for the
sender to disclose Ki, while using an already disclosed key to authenticate
the buﬀered packets. However, if the key is already disclosed, then receiver
will discard the packet.
Even though TESLA is eﬃcient, it still has few drawbacks. It authen-
ticates the initial packet with a digital signature which is too expensive for
wireless nodes and disclosing a key in each packet requires too much energy
for sending and receiving. TESLA is vulnerable to DoS attacks as malicious
nodes can create buﬀer overﬂow state in the receiver while it waits for the
sender to disclose its keys.
SPINS [25] introduces Micro Timed Eﬃcient Stream Loss-tolerant Au-
thentication (µTESLA), a modiﬁed version of TESLA which only uses sym-
metric mechanisms for packet authentication and it discloses the key once
per epoch. µTESLA is diﬀerent from TESLA as it allows a receiver to au-
thenticate the packets as soon as they arrive and it replaces receiver buﬀering
with sender buﬀering. Immediate authentication as well as buﬀering only at
the sender makes it a secure protocol against DoS. It has very low security
overhead. The computation, memory, and communication costs are also
small. Since the data authentication, freshness, and conﬁdentiality proper-
ties require transmitting only 8 bytes per message, µTESLA is considered a
very eﬀective and robust protocol for secure data broadcasting.
TESLA with Instant Key Disclosure (TIK)[11] is another protocol for
secure broadcasting implemented with temporal leashes in order to detect
wormholes (see section 5.9). TIK requires accurate time synchronization
between all communicating parties. It works almost in the same manner as
the base protocol TESLA, but in TIK the receiver can verify TESLA security
condition as it receives the packet. By eliminating the authentication delay
of TESLA, it allows sender to disclose the key in the same packet. TIK is
27therefore a more robust protocol than TESLA since it eliminates the waiting
time imposed by disclosing the keys only after the packet was received.
6 Conclusions
Achieving a secure routing protocol is an important task that is being chal-
lenged by the unique characteristics of an ad hoc wireless network. Tradi-
tional routing protocols fail to provide security, and rely on an implicit trust
between communicating nodes.
In this chapter we discuss security services and challenges in an ad hoc
wireless network environment. We examine and classify major routing at-
tacks and present a comprehensive survey on the state-of-the-art mecha-
nisms and solutions designed to defeat such attacks. A summary of the
secure routing mechanisms surveyed is presented in Table 1. The current
security mechanisms, each defeats one or few routing attacks. Designing
routing protocols resistant to multiple attacks remains a challenging task.
Protocol Security Mechanisms Attacks Prevented Comments
SEAD [7] - One-way hash
chains
-
Prevents an attacker
from forging better
metrics or sequence
numbers in routing
update packets
- Used with DSDV
- Designed to protect routing update
packets
- Does not prevent an attacker from
tampering other ﬁelds or from using
the learned metric and sequence num-
ber for sending new routing updates
Ariadne
[8]
- One-way hash
chains
- Prevents attackers
from tampering un-
compromised routes
consisting of uncom-
promised nodes
- Immune to worm-
hole attack
- Used with DSR
- Provides a strong defense against at-
tacks that modify and fabricate rout-
ing information
- Prone to selﬁsh node attack
SAR [13] - Qual-
ity of Protection
(QoP) metric
- Uses sequence num-
bers and timestamps
to stop replay at-
tacks in routing up-
date packets
- Used with AODV
- Route discovered may not be the
shortest route in terms of hop-count,
but it is always secured
- Defends gainst modiﬁcation and fab-
rication attacks
SRP [17] - Secure certiﬁ-
cate server
- Defends against at-
tacks that
disrupt the route dis-
covery process and
guarantees to iden-
tify the correct topo-
logical information
- Used with DSR, ZRP
- Lack of validation mechanism for
route maintenance messages
- Prone to wormhole attacks and invis-
ible node attacks
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[22]
- Secure certiﬁ-
cate server
- Provides network
services like authen-
tication and
non-repudiation
- Used with AODV, DSR
- Heavy asymmetric cryptographic
computation
- Prone to wormhole attack if accurate
time synchronozation is not available
CONFID-
ANT [2]
- Monitor
- Reputation Sys-
tem
- Path Manager
- Trust Manager
- Attacks on packet
forwarding and
routing are defended
eﬃciently
- Used with DSR
- Detection based reputation system
has few limitations
- Vulnerable to spooﬁng and sybil
attacks
Rushing
Attacks
and De-
fenses [9]
- Secure Neigh-
bor Detection
- Secure Route
Delegation
- Random-
ized Route Re-
quest Forwarding
- By limiting the to-
tal number of re-
quests sent by a node
and random forward-
ing, it prevents rush-
ing attack to a cer-
tain level
- Used with DSR, ARIADNE
- Network is still prone to rushing at-
tacks if an attacker can compromise k
nodes
- Higher overhead than other proto-
cols, but currently it is the only pro-
tocol that can defend against rushing
attacks
Wormhole
At-
tacks and
Defenses
[11]
- Packet Leashes
- Merkle Hash
Tree
- One-way Hash
Chains
- TIK when im-
plemeted with packet
leaches, ef-
fectively stops worm-
hole and DoS attacks
- Not feasible in resource constraint
networks due to the expensive crypto-
graphic mechanisms implemented
- Accurate time synchronization is not
easy to obtain
Sybil At-
tacks and
Defenses
[16]
- Radio Resource
Testing
- Random Key
Predistribution
- one-way Pseudo
Random Hash
Function
-
Multi-space Pairwise
Key Distribution is
most eﬀective mech-
anism against sybil
attack
- First work that proposes various de-
fense mechanisms against the Sybil
attacks
TESLA
[21]
- One-way Hash
Chain
- Uses loose time syn-
chronization and de-
layed time synchro-
nization to provide
secure broadcast
- Vulnerable to DoS attacks as mali-
cious nodes can create buﬀer overﬂow
state
- Accurate time synchronization is not
easy to obtain
Table 1: Comparison and summary of diﬀerent routing security mechanisms.
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